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Perhaps more than any other political phenomenon, incumbents’ capture of
political institutions through the manipulation of the rules of the electoral game has
commanded the attention of scholars of the law of democracy in recent years.1 Of
course, the phenomenon is not new, nor is scholarly or judicial preoccupation with it.2
However, whether the subject is gerrymandering,3 campaign finance reform,4 ballot
notations,5 primary election rules,6 ballot access7 or any number of other exertions of
state power to organize and sculpt the legal environment for elections, the question
recently has been: How can we develop institutions and constitutional rules that prevent
those in charge from using their power to insulate themselves from competition?
For many, this has led to an espousal, if not glorification, of the institutions of
direct democracy (initiative, referendum and recall) as critical and important safeguards
against incumbent entrenchment.8 Under this view, direct democracy allows for an endrun around incumbents, allowing the median voter in a jurisdiction to enact institutional
1

See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Richard
H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 25 (2004).
2
See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1981).
3
See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L . REV. 593 (2002); Nathaniel
Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to IncumbentProtecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002).
4
See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n 540 U.S. 93, ___ (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5
Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533
(1999).
6
See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms,
and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274 (2001); Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The
Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 88 GEO. L.J. 2181 (2001); Nathaniel Persily,
Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750 (2001).
7
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1; Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political
Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775 (2000).
8
Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV (forthcoming 2004); Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 239 (2004).
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reform seen as against the interests of political insiders who have clogged up the
“channels of political change.”9 By allowing voters to redesign electoral rules, the
initiative process has the potential to rein in dominant parties seeking to hobble their
opponents and to control cartelist behavior of incumbents that disadvantages outsiders.
Of course, as many have observed, the initiative process is hardly a tool used exclusively
or principally by the dispossessed or powerless. Insiders, too, can use this alternative
means of policy making to achieve their goals.10 Nevertheless, while recognizing that the
more and less powerful might exploit the tools of direct democracy, at least such
alternative means of policy change remain an option for outgroups in the initiative states.
Therefore, it might follow that certain types of laws – that is, those types of laws likely to
be favored by voters and disliked by incumbents – should be more prevalent in such
states where the initiative is an option. This paper attempts to test this hypothesis.
In particular, we hope to explore whether certain types of election regulation
appear more often in initiative states than non-initiative states. In so doing, we attempt to
build on the work of Caroline Tolbert, whose initial efforts to answer this question
predicted and found evidence that initiative states are more likely to pass certain
“governance policies” – that is, “procedural reforms that constrain the autonomy of state
legislatures, change the ‘rules’ that state and elected officials must follow, and restructure
political institutions.”11 Like others who have tried to study this problem, however, we

9

ELY, supra note 2, at 103.
See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.,
99, 99-128 (1992).
11
Caroline J. Tolbert, Changing Rules for State Legislatures: Direct Democracy and Governance Policies,
in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 171 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds.,
1998).
10
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run into the problem of defining the scope of our project – worrying that an overly
narrow approach could be written off as preoccupied with the politics of a specific issue
(e.g., redistricting) or that an overly broad approach glosses over greater variation among
the loosely defined category of laws we analyze. Figuring that more is better than less
and that our goal at this stage is as much to promote further research as it is to present our
own interpretation of the data, we have opted for the mile-wide-inch-deep approach since
we suspect that different readers will be interested in different types of reforms. We
therefore attempted the daunting task of gathering data on as many election law reforms
as possible. The reforms analyzed in this paper include term limits (both for governor
and state legislators), commission-based redistricting, public funding of campaigns,
campaign contribution limits, primary election structures for state legislative elections
and presidential nominations, women’s suffrage, state legislative malapportionment prior
to Baker v. Carr12 and the installation of the direct primary.
Because we canvass a broad array of laws in this area, we necessarily arrive at
some complicated conclusions. In Part I we present the aggregated data for each reform.
The first task we set for ourselves was to discover whether certain types of election laws
are more prevalent in states with direct democracy. Indeed, we find that some types of
reforms, such as term limits, are more prevalent in initiative states, while most others,
such as certain types of campaign finance regulation, are not. In the aggregate, we were
struck by how similar – in general and at this rough level – initiative and non-initiative
states were; however, we recognize that not all initiative states are created equal and that

12

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.
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coarsely grouping the states based on an on-off toggle for presence or absence of the
initiative fails to capture important differences between initiative states. In some states,
the barrier to placing a measure on the ballot are very low and political actors use the
initiative process quite frequently, while in many other states the initiative option is
available but rarely used. We therefore modified Caroline Tolbert’s distinctions about
general initiative usage13 to characterize initiative states further as “frequent users,”
moderate users,” and “infrequent users,” but were once again surprised to find few
differences among the states and measures we analyzed.
Because a simple frequency distribution depicting the prevalence of a particular
reform does not explain how the state passed the law, however, we also considered
whether the initiative states passed each of these reforms through the initiative process14
or through normal legislative means. Here we find considerable variation among the
laws we analyze. For the most part, however, we find that initiative states in fact pass
many of these reforms through normal legislative means, rather than through the
mechanisms of direct democracy.
Having surveyed the lay of the land, we turn in Part II to a more in depth
explanation of why initiative states may have adopted certain election law reforms. In
particular, we try to answer the question whether some legislatures pass election reforms

13

Tolbert, supra note 11, at 180. We used the same principle, the average number of measures appearing
on a ballot in a certain state divided by the number of years that state has had the initiative process, and
modified it to accommodate reforms isolated in certain decades. For example, the usage measures for
women’s suffrage and the direct primary measure usage through 1920; the measure for pre-Baker v. Carr
apportionment calculates usage through 1960. Calculations for all other reforms, as they are relatively
contemporary or span a large period of time, reflect usage through 2000.
14
Ballot initiatives in this study include only those sponsored by citizens or citizen groups; measures
sponsored by legislatures or government organizations are excluded.

5

out of fear of a voter initiative on a similar subject or simply because the legislators
themselves favor such a reform. Of course, each new reform – however passed in a given
state – usually arises from a unique impetus in the populace and/or the legislature. Some
legislatures pass a law because of the threat of an initiative, others because it is in the
dominant party’s self interest, and still others because legislators genuinely believe the
election reform, like any law, is justified as good public policy. We have therefore
attempted to comb through the available legislative histories and contemporaneous
sources to get a sense for whether and when legislatures have reacted to the initiative
threat. When the data are available, we also do our best to examine failed election law
initiatives in order to discuss why certain reformist dogs did not bark even when given
the chance.
In Part III we examine older election law controversies – specifically, the extent
and history of malapportionment in states before Baker v. Carr, the adoption of women’s
suffrage, and the adoption of the direct primary. Adoption of the institutions of direct
democracy sometimes coincided with the adoption of several of these structural reforms,
and at other times preceded them. Together they constituted components of a Progressive
vision of institutional change that sought to transfer power from captured legislatures and
corrupt party machines and toward the people.
In Part IV we present our conclusions. We arrive at a tentative conclusion that for
certain reforms that legislators, as a class, are likely to disfavor are more likely to be
passed in initiative states. The voters may go around their elected representatives to pass
such anti-incumbent laws or legislators might attempt to take the wind out of the sails of

6

an initiative effort by passing a similar law. However, we recognize that not all election
reforms threaten legislators equally and in some cases, a seemingly anti-incumbent
reform, when passed by the legislature or placed by a legislator on the ballot, takes a form
that promotes, rather than threatens, incumbents’ interests. Therefore, the anecdotal
evidence we present here may be more valuable than the aggregate findings, insofar as it
conveys the general theme that the presence of the initiative process might make some
reforms more likely.
Embedded within that tentative conclusion are a large number of caveats. First,
we recognize that not all initiative states are created equal, nor are specific types of
reforms. In other words, state laws vary with respect to the ease with which a voter can
place something on the ballot (such as the number of signatures required), and each of the
election law reforms we explore represents a rough grouping of laws that can vary
considerably with respect to the severity of their intrusion on elections. For the most
part, we identify here the presence or absence of a reform (e.g., term limits) without
examining the nature of the reform (e.g., how severe the term limits restriction is), the
reasons the sponsors placed the measure on the ballot or even who those sponsors were.
We also do not investigate, in any systematic way, instances in which courts strike down
election reform initiatives or legislatures hijack initiatives by amending them after the
fact.15 These constitute serious drawbacks, which we hope subsequent research will
remedy. That being said, we think much can be gained even from the rough cut of the
data we present here – whether or not it proves or disproves any particular hypothesis – if

15

See ELISABETH GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE.
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for no other reason than the fact that we discovered trends in the data that we did not
originally expect.

I.

Do Initiative States Have Different Election Law Regimes?

Figure A displays the frequency distribution for certain election laws in initiative
and non-initiative states. As mentioned above, we examine the following election
reforms: term limits affecting governors and state legislators, commission-based
redistricting, public funding of campaigns, campaign contribution limits, and primary
election structures for state legislative elections and presidential nominations. There is
considerable variation among the laws we cover in terms of whether differences exist
between these categories of states. While there are a handful of policies that initiative
states have adopted more often, most such reforms appear with relatively equal frequency
in initiative and non-initiative states. Only legislative term limits and commission based
redistricting seem to be much more prevalent in initiative states than in non-initiative
states. For most of the other reforms there appear not to be any significant differences
with respect to the frequency of a certain law between the two categories of states, and
for two – non-legislative term limits and pre-1920 women’s suffrage – a greater share of
non-initiative states appear to have adopted the given reform.

8
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We make a further distinction among initiative states by the frequency of
initiative use, as shown in Figure B. This distinction is important because the
institutional parameters regulating the use of the initiative process in each state, as we
mentioned, vary widely, and can significantly affect the success of initiative campaigns.
Thus, we might expect that, to the extent the initiative process is related to election law
reform, states with higher initiative use, for whatever reason (a progressive culture, loose
institutional parameters, etc.) might be more likely to adopt election law reforms. As the
states are relatively evenly distributed among the three categories, high usage, moderate
usage, and low usage,16 the absolute numbers used below are instructive. While in many
cases, such as term limits, campaign contribution limits, and pre-1920 women’s suffrage,
higher initiative usage characterizes the states that have enacted reforms, we do not
observe any strong systematic patterns.

16

Of the 24 states that currently have the initiative process, Caroline Tolbert has identified eight as “high”
users, nine as “moderate” users, and seven as “low” users. See supra note 11.
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In order to establish whether the presence of the initiative process affects the
likelihood that a state will adopt a particular reform, it would be helpful (though not
dispositive) to know whether initiative states passed these election reforms through the
initiative process or through legislative action. As presented in Figure C, here we find
even greater variation among the laws in our study; some provisions more than others
appear particularly likely to being passed by initiative. Initiative states have passed
legislative term limits only through the initiative process, for example, whereas all public
funding programs for non-legislative elections and most efforts to establish equal
suffrage for women and commission-based redistricting were passed through normal
legislative means.

10
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Figure C. Among States with the Initiative Process, Mechanism Used to Achieve Reform
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The tendency to pass election reform through the initiative process might not be
uniform among initiative states, however. In other words, perhaps some initiative states,
because of history, culture or the strategies accepted and perfected by parties and interest
groups, are more likely to use the initiative process for election reform. As Figure D
indicates, we find limited support for that proposition. Those states with high or
moderate usage of the initiative process were somewhat more likely than low usage states
to use that process to pass election reforms, but the differences between the states are not
dramatic.
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II. Contemporary Case Studies
A. Term Limits
Of the laws we analyze, legislative term limits represent the most severe intrusion
on the interests of individual legislators.17 We should therefore expect initiative states to
be more likely to pass such limits, given that legislators in non-initiative states would
generally be unwilling to curtail their career options. In fact, as existing research has
documented, with the exception of one state, state legislative term limits exist only in
states whose voters have the initiative process available to them.18 Moreover, in those
states, the initiative process has been the only successful avenue for reform.

17

Tolbert, supra note 11.
U.S. Term Limits, State Legislative Term Limits, at
http://www.termlimits.org/Current_Info/State_TL/index.html.
18

12

pre-1920 State-Level Equal
Suffrage

Table 1.

States Imposing Term Limits on State Legislators

Status of Initiative

Among Initiative States, How Achieved?
Initiative
Legislative
Existed in % through
Process
Action
Constitution Initiative

Term Limits on Legislators
Yes
No
Total

Initiative States
Frequent Users

5

3

8

5

-

-

100%

Moderate Users

7

2

9

7

-

-

100%

3

4

7

3

-

-

100%

Total Initiative States

Infrequent Users

15

9

24

15

-

-

100%

Non-Initiative States
Total

1
16

25
34

26
50

-

1

-

In Louisiana, one of two states whose legislature adopted such limits (Utah’s
limits, as discussed shortly, were adopted and then repealed), strong public agitation for
the reform prompted state legislators in 1995 to approve a state constitutional amendment
to limit its own terms.19 Several legislators asserted that the public’s support for the
measure inspired the bill: “I think term limits are not the way to go, but I felt after due
consideration that people in this state and in the country are looking for term limits and I
should give them a chance to vote on it.”20 The amendment was approved in a voter
referendum later that year by a margin of 3:1.21
While the legislature did approve the constitutional amendment to be sent to the
voters, it protected itself somewhat by declining to pass limits that would take effect in
the ensuing few years. Ultimately, the provision in Louisiana, compared to all states with

19

Statewide Constitutional Amendments, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 1995, at A4; Term
Limits for Louisiana Now Up to the Voters, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 15, 1995, at A1; Term
Limits Movement in the Louisiana Legislature, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Nov. 18, 1994, at 9B.
20
Term Limits for Louisiana Now Up to the Voters, supra note 14, at A1 (quoting former Senate President
Samuel Nunez).
21
Louisiana Secretary of State, Results for Election Date 10/21/95, at
http://www.sos.louisiana.gov:8090/cgibin/?rqstyp=elcms4&rqsdta=102195.
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legislative limits, will have seen the most years pass before it takes effect in 2007. Apart
from Louisiana’s adoption of term limits through the legislative process, though, which
was spurred by the success of the national movement and state level public sentiment in
favor of reform, the overwhelming message from the legislative term limits movement is
that it was successful because of the availability and use of the direct initiative. Indeed,
we should emphasize the uniqueness of the legislative term limits movement that swept
through initiative states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although one might consider
term limits to be the paradigmatic case of a citizen-favored, legislator-opposed measure
ripe for passage through the initiative process, the presence of a unique, well-funded,
ideologically motivated movement, as well as a desire to use the initiative process,
distinguish term limits from the other reforms we analyze.
As a point of comparison, we have also investigated the adoption of gubernatorial
term limits laws. While many gubernatorial term limit provisions exist in state
constitutions and date back to the 1800s, other states passed them during a less
concentrated reform movement that spanned the second half of the twentieth century. As
the table above shows, 36 states currently have laws restricting the number of terms its
governor can serve. Of these, more than half, or twenty, exist in states in which the
initiative process is not available.22 Among the sixteen states that have gubernatorial
term limits that also have the initiative process, only one state (Utah) achieved them
through the legislative process. The remaining fifteen, or 94%, used the initiative to
install term limits, as shown on the left side of the following table:
22

U.S. Term Limits, State Gubernatorial Term Limits, at
http://www.termlimits.org/Current_Info/State_TL/gubernatorial.html.
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Table 2.

States Imposing Term Limits on Governors

Status of Initiative

Among Initiative States, How Achieved?
Initiative
Legislative
Existed in % through
Process
Action
Constitution Initiative

Term Limits on Governors
Yes
No
Total

Initiative States
Frequent Users

5

3

8

5

-

-

100%

Moderate Users

7

2

9

7

-

-

100%

3

4

7

3

-

-

100%

Total Initiative States

Infrequent Users

15

9

24

15

-

-

100%

Non-Initiative States
Total

20
35

6
15

26
50

-

11

9

Even in Utah, the statutory term limits measure, which applied to both legislators and to
governors, was passed by the legislature while a strong grassroots movement was
underway; the sponsor noted that the measure was “absolutely ridiculous”, but then
“conceded it was better than limitations imposed by grass-roots petitions now circulating
among voters.”23 The indirect pressure of the initiative process, then, was sufficient to
spur the legislature to action. When it did, the grassroots movement died away, and a
competing measure that was presented on the ballot later that year failed. The legislature
had the last laugh the following year: in March of 2003, it repealed the law.
In contrast, though, many legislatures in the states without the initiative, shown at
the bottom of the previous table, were the vehicle for gubernatorial term limits. Of the
twenty states that have term limits on governors that were established without the

23

Ethics-Reform Bills Buried in Utah’s Legislative Grave, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 3, 1994, at A1.
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availability of the initiative process, nine of them were cemented in place with the
adoption of the state constitution. The remaining eleven were enacted through
constitutional amendments that were approved through the legislative process.24
The comparison of legislative and gubernatorial term limits laws highlights the
central position of the legislature as the potential choke point for election reform
legislation. Whereas several legislatures have been willing to limit the terms of the
governor, only one has subjected its own members to term limits. Moreover, the term
limits movement is unique in its exploitation of the initiative process. With only one
exception, the initiative states that have term limits for either governor or state legislature
got them through the initiative process. As will become clear, however, term limits exist
at the far end of the spectrum. For no other reform is the importance of the initiative and
the recalcitrance of state legislators so clear.

B. Commission-Based Redistricting for State Legislatures

In an effort to promote competition and the election of moderate representatives,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has threatened to place an initiative on the California
ballot that would transfer authority over the redistricting process from the legislature to a
commission composed of retired judges. This move, as well as the widespread

24

Based on information available at http://www.termlimits.org.
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frustration in many states (let alone among law professors25) concerning low levels of
competition for Congress and state legislatures, has reinvigorated interest in creating
institutions dedicated to removing incumbent protection and partisan greed as the
principal motivations behind the redistricting process.26 Insofar as unchecked
redistricting power allows dominant legislative parties or cartels of legislators to act in
ways contrary to voters’ perceived interests, we might expect initiative states to be more
likely to pass redistricting reform. We therefore examined which states have transferred
power over the redistricting process from the legislature to a commission of some sort.
Of course, we recognize that commissions come in many forms – some are the primary
means of redistricting, others exist merely as a backup in case the legislature fails to pass
a plan, and in still other states the commission’s plan is merely advisory.27 Moreover, we
also recognize that in some states, depending on how the members of a redistricting
commission are appointed, commissions might constitute mere proxies for the dominant
party of a legislature or for a bipartisan cartel.28
With these caveats in mind, however, we still might expect initiative states to
attempt to increase the distance between linedrawers and those whose careers their efforts
would most likely affect. In other words, insofar as the normal process of legislation
gives legislators the greatest potential control over the redistricting process (not an
25

See Issacharoff, supra note __.
See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AMER.
POLIT. SCI. 541, 543 (1994) (“Any good politician knows the consequences of letting the opposition party
draw the district boundaries . . . on average, redistricting favors the party that draws the lines more than if
the other party were to draw the lines.”).
27
Distinctions among categories of redistricting commissions have been difficult to make. Commissions in
states such as Iowa, for example, can be overruled by the legislature although the commission still retains
control over the submission of subsequent plans. For the purposes of this section, we have used the
distinctions by the National Council of State Legislatures. [confirm]
28
See Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses, supra note 3.
26
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uncontestable claim to be sure), we would expect greater variation with respect to the
institutions in control of redistricting in initiative states. Indeed, as the table below
indicates, we find a relationship suggesting just that.
Table 3.

States Using Redistricting Commissions for Legislative Redistricting

Status of Initiative

Type of Commission
Advisory
Backup

Primary

Initiative States
Frequent Users
Moderate Users
Infrequent Users
Total Initiative States

4
4
1
9

Non-Initiative States
Total

3
12

-

Subtotal

1
1
1

2
3

5
4
4
13

2
3

2
5

7
20

-

Use Commission?
Yes
None

5
4
4
13

3
5
3
11

8
9
7
24

7
20

19
30

26
50

Redistricting commissions, used in some capacity in twenty states, are almost
twice as common in states that have either the constitutional or statutory initiative process
than in those that do not. In particular, nine of the twelve states that use commissions as
the primary institution for redistricting are initiative states. However, as the table below
indicates, most laws transferring power over redistricting to commissions were not passed
(or even pursued) through the initiative process among initiative states: legislatures in six
of the nine initiative states that use commissions voted to cede their redistricting
authority. With that said, all three states that have used the initiative process to institute
commission-based redistricting are high-usage states.

18

Total

Table 4.

How States with the Initiative Process Adopted Redistricting Commissions

Status of Initiative
Initiative States
Frequent Users
Moderate Users
Infrequent Users
Total Initiative States

How Commissions Were Adopted: By Type of Commission
Primary
Advisory
Backup
Initiative Not Init.
Initiative Not Init.
Initiative Not Init.

3
3

1
4
1
6

75%
0%
0%
33%

-

-

1

1 0%
1 0%

1

-

Total
Initiative Not Init.

4

100%

2 0%
2 33%

4

Only four states, Arkansas in 1936, Oklahoma in 1962, Colorado in 1974, and
Arizona in 2000 were successful in transferring control over redistricting to authorities
through direct constitutional initiatives; three other states, Oklahoma in 1960, North
Dakota in 1973 and California in 1990, attempted to install redistricting commissions
through the initiative process and failed.29 In the remaining seventeen states that use
commissions, ten of which are initiative states, legislative action established them. Even
though states with the initiative process available are more likely to have commissions, in
most cases they did not get them through the initiative process.
Why is this the case? What prompted legislatures in states such as Missouri,
Arkansas, Washington, and Ohio - all of which have the initiative process and also use
independent commissions as the primary agent for redistricting – to cede control over the
state legislative redistricting process? For example, Washington’s adoption of the
independent commission, we suspect, was prompted by a combination of a tradition of

29

Initiative and Referendum Institute, Statewide Initiatives Since 1904-2000, at
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Historical/State
wide%20Initiatives%201904-2000.pdf (Feb. 11 2004).
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1
4
4
9

80%
0%
0%
31%

progressivism and the threat offered by the initiative. In 1981, the state legislature
experienced considerable difficulty with the congressional reapportionment process as
the governor vetoed the legislature’s first plan and a federal court panel invalidated the
second, spurring intense partisan bickering over the ensuing few years as the legislature
struggled to create a new map. At the same time, while the state legislative redistricting
plan created by the legislature was approved with relative ease, minority Democrats’
complaint of partisan gerrymandering coincided with a citizens’ group’s filing of an
initiative to require an independent commission to redistrict state legislative boundaries.30
The following year, a competing amendment emerged from the state legislature that
transferred authority of all redistricting, congressional and legislative, to an independent
commission, and was approved by the voters in the fall of 1983.31 In Washington, at
least, the legislators seemed willing to relinquish control over an onerous, knotty process,
particularly when they could pre-empt a competing measure emerging from the public.

C. Campaign Finance Reform
In the jurisprudence and scholarship concerning campaign finance reform, a
healthy debate exists concerning whether certain types of reform favor incumbents.
Because challengers to incumbents are often poorly funded and incumbents already enter
a race with name recognition that only money could otherwise buy, reformers often seek
measures with the intention of equalizing the electoral playing field. We examine here

30

Spellman Vetoes, Signs Parts of Redistricting Plan, THE SEATTLE TIMES, May 18, 1981, at ___.
See http://www.redistricting.wa.gov/; see also
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/redistricting2/1980s/1982/1982_courtCases.aspx.
31
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two types of campaign finance reform: public funding and contribution limits.
Proponents of public funding (usually accompanied by spending limits) often see it as a
way of closing the spending gap between incumbents and challengers, and advocates of
contribution limits often hope that doing so will curtail the fundraising advantages of
incumbents. On the other hand, opponents of such reforms also worry that any limits on
campaign funding activity necessarily help incumbents because challengers need all the
money they can get in order to compete with the natural advantages all incumbents share.
By analyzing the frequency of certain reforms in initiative and non-initiative
states we had hoped to shed light on this controversy. Perhaps if only initiative states
passed such reforms we might conclude that they were, by nature, anti-incumbent or procompetition. Given that these two groupings of states do not appear to differ in any
systematic way with respect to campaign finance reform, we cannot add much to the
underlying debate. However, anecdotes from particular states suggest that the presence
of the initiative option often leads to the enactment of campaign finance reforms
specifically disfavored by incumbents.

1. Public Financing

Laws that provide public financing to candidates for elected office exist in 27
states32 and vary considerably in form. Differences in the amount of money provided, the

32

Benjamin Wyatt, Origins of State Public Financing of Elections: A Comprehensive Database of State
Public Financing Systems (2002) (B.A. thesis, Wesleyan University), available at
http://www.octobernight.com/bwyatt/add1.htm.
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source of that money, how and when it is distributed, and how a candidate qualifies for it
make any systematic evaluation of these laws somewhat challenging. When they were
adopted, public financing laws were expected to facilitate quality challenges to
entrenched incumbents by equalizing the availability of funds for challengers’
campaigns. In retrospect, there is not much evidence that this has been the case; research
suggests that public financing is irrelevant to the outcome of state legislative elections33
except when the funds available are particularly high,34 and some scholars even assert
that the availability of public funds, while narrowing the spending gap, has neither
increased the competitiveness of elections or the number of challengers that choose to
run.35
While public financing may not have a negative impact on incumbents, it is still
possible that the perceived effects of the reform influence legislators’ attitudes toward
reform when they consider it. So long as legislators anticipate that the effects of public
financing laws would be detrimental, we might expect the initiative process to be
influential to the adoption of the reform. Alternatively, legislators in favor or indifferent
to public financing regimes may nevertheless be reluctant to pass them out of fear that
voters might consider incumbents as voting to subsidize their own campaigns. As with
other types of reforms that legislators might consider electoral risks, making tax dollars

33

ALEXANDER, HERBERT E. REFORM AND REALITY: THE FINANCING OF STATE AND LOCAL CAMPAIGNS.
NEW YORK: TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND PRESS [DISTRIBUTED BY THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.], 1991.
34
Patrick D. Donnay & Graham P. Ramsden, Public Financing of Legislative Elections: Lessons from
Minnesota,” 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 351, 351-364 (1995).
35
Kenneth R. Mayer & John M. Wood, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competitiveness:
Evidence from Wisconsin, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 69, 69-88 (1995).
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available for candidate campaigns may be one of those issues over which legislators
would prefer to pass the buck to the voters.
As depicted below, public financing laws for any number of state offices exist in
27 states, but public funding for state legislative campaigns exist in only seven states.36
No differences appear between initiative and non-initiative states with respect to their
propensity to pass public financing reforms for either legislative or some other office.

Status of Initiative

Laws Providing for Public
Financing, by Office
State
Other State
No Public
Legislators
Office
Financing

Total

Initiative States
Frequent Users
Moderate Users
Infrequent Users

4
1
2
1

9
2
5
2

11
5
2
4

24
8
9
7

Non-Initiative States
Total

3
7

11
20

12
23

26
50

57%

45%

48%

48%

% Initiative States

The initiative process does appear to be used more frequently for legislative
public funding regimes than for other state offices. In the following table, note that, of
the thirteen state-level public financing laws that exist in initiative states, only three were
installed through the initiative process, and all three of them, evenly distributed among

36

Wyatt, supra note 26.
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usage categories, fund state legislative campaigns. In contrast, legislatures (not voters)
passed all nine public funding programs for non-legislative offices in initiative states

Table 5.

States with Public Funding Provisions for Statewide and Legislative Campaigns

Status of Initiative

Public Financing: Non-Legislators
How Passed?
No
Total
Initiative Not Init.

Yes

Public Financing: State Legislators
How Passed?
No
Total
Initiative Not Init.

Yes

Initiative States
Frequent Users

2

6

8

-

2

1

7

8

1

Moderate Users

5

4

9

-

5

2

7

9

1

Infrequent Users

2

5

7

-

2

1

6

7

1

Total Initiative States

9

15

24

-

9

4

20

24

3

Non-Initiative States
Total

11
20

15
30

26
50

3
7

23
43

26
50

As noted above, legislators’ propensity to pass public funding regimes only for
offices other than their own is consistent with several hypotheses, any of which may be
true for the individual cases we list here. Perhaps legislators fear that public funding
would help their potential opponents or they consider such reforms too controversial,
such that they preferred to pass the buck to the initiative process. Or perhaps, as with any
initiative, public funding may simply be one of those issues, which legislators do not
view as a priority but which a concerted group of voters can successfully place on the
ballot before a receptive public.

2. Contribution Limits

24

1
-

1

Contribution limits exist as probably the most popular form of campaign finance
reform, as well as perhaps the easiest to understand. As discussed above, a considerable
debate exists concerning such limits’ oft described anti-incumbent or pro-competitive
effects. Of course, the potential forms of a contribution limit are as varied as the tactics
used to evade them. States may ban or place various types of limits on contributions
from different entities, such as individuals, political action committees, political parties,
corporations, unions, and out-of-state citizens. Like public financing laws, limits on
campaign contributions vary extensively in type, amount, and parameters for
enforcement. We concentrate here on the presence or absence of limits on individual
contributions to candidate campaigns. For the purposes of this study, we were
particularly interested in the propensity of legislatures or voters to adopt such limits. As
the following table shows, limits on contributions to state legislative campaigns exist
nearly equally among initiative states as in non-initiative states.

Contribution
Limits *

Limits on
Individuals

No
Limits

Initiative States
Frequent Users
Moderate Users
Infrequent Users

18
6
8
4

6
2
3
1

24
8
11
5

75%
75%
73%
80%

Non-Initiative States

19

7

26

73%

Total

37

13

50

* All laws in this portion of our study apply to state legislators.
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Total

% with
Limits

Moreover, among the states with contribution limits in which the initiative process exists,
just over half were introduced using the initiative process, mostly concentrated among
high and moderate initiative users:37

Table 6.

Limits on Contributions by Individuals to Candidates for State Legislative Offices

Initiative Status

Yes

Limits Exist?
No
Total

Average Limits, by Office
Assembly
Senate

%

Contribution Limits: How Passed?
% Init.
Initiative Legislation Total

Initiative States
Frequent Users

6

2

8

75%

$

1,149

$

1,411

4

2

6

67%

Moderate Users

7

1

8

88%

$

693

$

764

3

4

7

43%

Infrequent Users

4

4

8

50%

$

2,450

$

2,450

2

2

4

50%

Total Initiative States

17

7

24

71%

$ 1,333

$ 1,448

9

8

17

53%

Non-Initiative States
Total

19
36

7
14

26
50

73%

$ 1,442
$ 1,498
Difference $ (109) -8%

$ 1,883
$ 1,721
$ (435)

-23%

If we want to get a better grasp on the effect of the initiative process on the
likelihood of passage of contribution limits in general or low limits in particular, we need
to know more about the types of limits passed and the political struggles (if any) that led
to their passage. We do not engage in a systematic analysis here, except to point out in
the table below the data comparing the average severity of contribution limits for state
37

The average limits recorded in this chart are derived from Federal Election Commission data and refer to
limits on individual contributions to candidates for state legislative offices in a given year. To the extent
the state law distinguishes between general and primary elections, these limits apply to general elections.
To the extent the state law distinguishes between election years and non-election years, these limits apply
to election years. These data do not take into account further restrictions by election cycle on aggregate
individual contribution limits. The entry for Rhode Island, which has less restrictive limits for candidates
qualified to receive public funding, assumes the candidate has not qualified for public funding. The entry
for New Hampshire, which has less restrictive limits for candidates who voluntarily limit their
expenditures, assumes the candidate has not voluntarily agreed to limit expenditures. See Edward D.
Feigenbaum and James A. Palmer, Campaign Finance Law 2002: A Summary of State Campaign Finance
Laws with Quick Reference Charts Chart 2-A (2002), available online at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfl/cfl02/cfl02chart2a.htm (last visited Jan 31, 2005) (compiling state laws
regulating campaign contributions).
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legislators in the initiative and non-initiative states that have adopted contribution limits.
On average, initiative states have set lower contribution limits than non-initiative states:
about $400 lower (23%) for contributions to races for a state’s lower house and about
$100 (8%) lower for state senate races. Of course, this relationship might be spurious or
due to other factors such as the size of a state’s population or economy, and we cannot
say that the presence of the initiative process itself caused these differences. We have not
yet found a dataset that explains which limits were passed by initiative, so we cannot test
our strong intuition that the average initiative is probably more restrictive than the
average piece of campaign finance reform legislation.
Beyond the summary statistics though, we are awash in anecdotal evidence
suggesting that in particular states the presence of the initiative was essential to the
passage of certain contribution limits. In some cases voters rallied behind and passed
initiatives seeking to change the permissive limits established by the legislature. In
others, legislators bowed to pressure from a threatened initiative. In still others, the
legislature voted to raise limits set by a previous initiative. Here are just a few
examples38:
•

38

Missouri: In 1994, citizens gathered signatures for a measure to set $100
contribution limits for legislative races. In an attempt to head-off the
initiative, the legislature passed $250 contribution limits. The initiative
was placed on the ballot went to the ballot anyhow, winning. The Eighth
Circuit rejected those $100 limits, so the legislative limits of $250 went
into effect. They were then adjusted for inflation to become $275, and
then those limits too were voided by the courts. The Supreme Court then

We are indebted to Derek Cressman, Director of www.therestofus.org, for these examples.
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reviewed the limits and reinstated them in the Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC.39

39

•

California: A 1996 initiative established a $500 contribution limit for state
legislature and $1000 for statewide office. A 2000 legislatively referred
ballot measure repealed prop 208 and established much higher limits
($3000 legislature, $20,000 for governor).

•

Colorado: A 1996 initiative set contribution limits of $100 for legislative
races and $500 for governor. The legislature then raised the limits to
$1000 per 2 year cycle for House, $1500 for Senate, and $5000 for
governor in 2000. In 2002, voters went back and by initiative passed a
constitutional amendment setting limits of $200 per election for legislative
races and $500 per election for statewide races.

•

Alaska: The legislature passed a law for $500 legislative contribution
limits in 1996 only after threatened by citizens filing 30,000 signatures to
qualify an initiative that would have set lower limits. In 2003, the
legislature doubled these contribution limits. In 2004, citizens submitted
36,000 signatures to qualify an initiative for the 2006 ballot to take them
back down to $500.

•

Oregon: In 1994, voters passed an initiative to set $100 limits on
legislative races, which the Oregon courts later threw out under the state
constitution. Citizens have filed (but not yet qualified) a constitutional
amendment to allow for contribution limits for the 2006 ballot.

•

Montana: In 1994 citizens passed an initiative to set $100 limits for
contributions to legislative candidates. Despite several attempts, the
legislature has not successfully increased those limits.

•

Arkansas: In 1996, voters approved an initiative to lower contribution
limits from $1000 to $100 for legislative races, but the courts later struck
it down.

•

Massachusetts: In 1990, the legislature enacted $500 contribution limits,
but only after citizens had gathered signatures for a ballot question.

•

Ohio: In late 2004, the Ohio legislature passed a law to radically increase
their contribution limits from $2500 to $10000. Citizens are threatening a
referendum to repeal this law.

528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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These examples illustrate the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process
on campaign finance reform. Although the data may not suggest a robust effect at first
glance, for certain states direct democracy has been an indispensable avenue of success
for outside reformers blocked by recalcitrant legislatures. Moreover, once the legislative
logjam breaks in initiative states (either because the voters act themselves or legislatures
pass such reforms) they tend to adopt stricter limits than non-initiative states. At the
same time, most legislatures in non-initiative states, as is true for the federal government,
have also acted on their own to establish contribution limits.

D. Nomination Systems
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones,40
striking down California’s “blanket primary” initiative, law professors have spilled a lot
of ink debating a party’s First Amendment right of expressive association implicated by
state regulation of primaries.41 In Jones the Court clarified that a state (which includes a
majority of voters acting through the initiative process) violates a party’s First
Amendment rights when it forces the party to include nonmembers in its primary.
Advocates of reforms, such as the blanket primary, see them as shifting power away from
party leaders and the party faithful and toward the median voter in the electorate, perhaps
also spurring competition in the process. The picture such advocates paint is one of a

40

530 U.S. 567 (2000).
See Garrett, Is The Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Issacharoff,
Private Parties With Public Purposes, supra note 6; Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political
Party Autonomy, supra note 6; Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, supra note 1.
41
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largely moderate electorate held hostage by extremist partisans who stand in the way of
reform of the nomination process and who have no incentive to change the primary
system that for most districts represents the dispositive election. Although the Jones
decision blunts possible anti-party innovation by way of the initiative process,
investigating whether systematic differences as to primary systems exist between
initiative and non-initiative states can give us some idea as to whether incumbents may
have historically held up more open nomination systems.
We examine here nomination systems for both state legislature and for
nominating the President. The principal difference between the two systems is that some
states hold caucuses, instead of primaries, for President, and in a few states, the rules are
different for Democrats and Republicans. Although an infinite number of nomination
systems potentially exist, we have divided systems into four general categories to get a
sense of the trends in the states we analyzed:
•
•
•

•

Closed primary – Only party members can vote in a
party’s primary.
Semi-open Primary – Party members can only vote in
their party’s primary but independents can choose any
party’s primary ballot.
Open primary – Anyone, regardless of party affiliation
or non-affiliation, can vote in any party’s primary.
This includes states that do not keep track of or do not
require party affiliation, and states that have a blanket
primary where voters can switch party primaries for
each office.
Caucus – A gathering of voters in a town hall style
meeting in order to nominate a candidate. Caucuses can
also be open or closed. No state has a semi-closed
caucus.
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We began an examination of the data presented in this section without a clear
hypothesis to test. On the one hand, consistent with the drama surrounding California’s
experiment with the blanket primary, perhaps we should expect initiative states to be
more likely to have open primaries because the median voter can act (or threaten) through
the initiative process to ensure a greater degree of choice or openness in a primary
election. If we assume that party stalwarts are more likely to want to close their
primaries to non-members and that party organizations can more easily execute such
restrictions through their alter egos in the legislature, then we should expect non-initiative
states to have closed primaries. On the other hand, voters in initiative states may not
necessarily want to open up their primaries, nor might party leaders in non-initiative
states necessarily prefer closed systems. Perhaps the preferences of voters or legislators
is more a function of state-based idiosyncrasies as to whether parties want their nominees
to cater to a broader electorate at the primary stage.
As the tables below indicate, we find almost no difference between initiative and
non-initiative states with respect to the openness of their primary systems for either state
legislative or presidential elections. Indeed, the two classes of state appear almost
identical.42 The only differences worth noting is a somewhat larger number of initiative
states (six out of twenty four as opposed to four out of twenty-six for non-initiative
states) that employ caucuses for nominating presidential candidates, and the fact that

42

The data for Presidential nominating processes refers to the rules of the 2004 Democratic Party primary
or caucus for each state, but the differences between the parties are not so substantial that they would
change our conclusions. We have used older data for the state legislative primaries because we wanted to
capture the state of the world before California Democratic Party v. Jones made forcing a blanket primary
on parties unconstitutional. Nevertheless, updating the data to 2004 also would not change our
conclusions.
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frequent users of the initiative seem somewhat more likely to have closed primaries than
infrequent users. However, we consider the remarkable similarity between these states to
be more significant than these small differences.

Table 7. State-Level Nominations by Availability of the Initiative, as of 1990

Closed
Status of Initiative Process
Initiative States
Frequent Users
Moderate Users
Infrequent Users
Total Initiative States
Non-Initiative States
Total

Table 8.

Nomination Process
Semi-Open
Open

Total

5
2
1
8

1
2
0
3

2
4
7
13

8
8
8
24

8
16

4
7

14
27

26
50

Distribution of Presidential Nominating Systems by Status of the Initiative Process, as of 2004

Closed
Status of Initiative Process
Initiative States
Frequent Users
Moderate Users
Infrequent Users
Total Initiative States
Non-Initiative States
Total

Primary Election
Open
Semi-Open

Total

Closed

Caucus
Open

Total

Primary and Caucus Systems
Closed Semi-Open Open

4
3
0
7

1
1
1
3

1
4
3
8

6
8
4
18

0
1
2
3

2
0
1
3

2
1
3
6

4
4
2
10

1
1
1
3

3
4
4
11

8
9
7
24

10
17

3
6

9
17

22
40

1
4

3
6

4
10

11
21

3
6

12
23

26
50

We were also surprised to discover how frequently legislators introduced bills
concerning who can vote in a primary election. From 2001-2004 legislators from thirty
states introduced 87 bills that would have opened up their states’ presidential primary to
independent voters or to voters of the opposing party.43 However, only five such

43

Total

National Conference of State Legislatures, Database of Election Reform Legislation, supra note 38.
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proposals became law. Even fewer initiatives were proposed. By our count only
California and Washington have passed initiatives seeking to change their primary
systems. California’s experiment with the blanket primary ended with the Jones
decision, as mentioned above, but just this past year the voters shot down a proposed
initiative for a non-partisan primary, in which the top two vote-getters of any party in the
primary move on to the general election. However, the voters approved such a measure
in Washington, which for the previous sixty-seven years had employed a blanket
primary.44

III. Early Examples of Electoral Reform
In this Part we turn back the clock to look at early election reforms and the effect
(if any) that the initiative process may have had on their enactment. In addition to
highlighting the relationship of different Progressive Era reforms to each other, by taking
this look back we hope to get some sense as to whether electoral reform initiatives (or
threats of them) may have been more prevalent or effective in earlier years and whether
initiative states as a group may have behaved differently at the time they instituted direct
democracy. En route to examining those phenomena, we should admit a drawback to
some of the analysis presented previously: issues such as term limits, campaign finance,
44

See Chuck Taylor, A Washington Primary Primer, SEATTLE WKLY., Dec. 1-7, 2004, available at
http://www.seattleweekly.com/features/0448/041201_news_primary_primer.php. After Jones, the parties
in Washington successfully challenged the blanket primary. The Legislature then passed a law instituting a
non-partisan primary, which was vetoed by the Governor. A back-up bill instituting an open primary for
the 2004 elections received the Governor’s signature. However, the voters passed the nonpartisan primary
initiative in the November general election. See id; Washington Secretary of State, History of the Blanket
Primary in Washington, at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/bp_history.aspx.
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and redistricting reform have only been “issues” for the past thirty years or so.
Legislative term limits, in particular, and the movement that used the initiative process so
skillfully to have them instituted are creatures of the late 1980s and 1990s. Thus,
preoccupation with these trendy reforms could skew conclusions as to the independent
effect of the availability of the initiative process election reform generally.
In this section we analyze the potential role the initiative process played in
instituting the direct primary, women’s suffrage, and pre-Baker v. Carr redistricting. The
first two measures, plus direct election of Senators and direct democracy,45 represented a
family of Progressive and Populist reforms that existed as a program for broadening
political participation and moving power away from captured legislatures or party
bosses.46 We run into a problem in analyzing the relationship of direct democracy to
these other Progressive Era reforms because states instituted them in a relatively short
time frame as part of a coherent package of reforms. Moreover, eventually all states
instituted women’s suffrage, the direct primary and direct election of Senators so the
most we can analyze is whether those states with the initiative process were first to move
on these issues and whether they used the initiative process to pass these reforms. In
general, we find few differences between initiative and non-initiative states and rare
instances where voters used the initiative process to pass such reforms.
Pre-Baker redistricting is a bit more complicated. By comparing degrees of
malapportionment and last date of redistricting among initiative and non-initiative states
45

In a footnote, we analyze direct election of Senators before the Seventeenth Amendment. See infra note
__.
46
See generally Nathaniel Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative,
Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL. REV. 11 (1997).
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we had hoped to get some sense of whether the people tended to rise up against
malapportioned legislatures when the law allowed it. We find some differences between
initiative and non-initiative states but states rarely used the initiative process to force
redistricting or to pass a plan. We offer some hypotheses as to why such differences
might appear in the data.

A. The Direct Primary
Progressive electoral reform took different forms in different parts of the country
at the turn of the century. In the West where Populism ruled, the targets of reformers’ ire
were legislatures captured by railroads and other trusts, while in the East reformers set
their sights on corrupt, urban party machines.47 Both strains of Progressivism, however,
pushed for adoption of the direct primary, which they saw as diminishing the power of
party bosses as well as expanding popular participation in the political process. We
might expect that politicians who owed their current position, at least in part, to the
nomination mechanism that got them there, would be reluctant to change it. Moreover,
the party organization might exert power over incumbents to block a reform that would
diminish the organization’s power to select candidates. If so, we should expect noninitiative states to be less likely than initiative states to pass direct primary legislation.
We do not find this to be the case. For the most part initiative and non-initiative states
were both very likely to pass such reforms, although in half of the initiative states direct
primary legislation was passed through the initiative process.

47

Id.
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Although states had barely begun to enact direct primary laws before 1900, all but
three of the forty-eight states had done so by 1915.48 As before, the following table
identifies states’ adoption of direct primary laws as of 1915 according to the presence or
absence of the initiative process at the time the direct primary was adopted. The three
states that had not provided for direct primary elections—Connecticut, New Mexico, and
Rhode Island—all lacked initiative processes as well.49 However, the presence of the
initiative clearly was neither necessary nor sufficient for the establishment of the direct
primary, as demonstrated by the fact that 83% of the non-initiative states passed direct
primary laws during this period. More revealing is the fact that the average year of
adoption of the direct primary for non-initiative states (1907) was actually earlier than
that for initiative states (1909). We do not mean to make more of this than to say that
initiative states as a group were certainly not early adopters, or at least not moreso than
noninitiative states.

48

See ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY 19 (2002).
These three states did not fall slightly behind in their reform efforts. All three refused to create direct
primaries for many more decades. ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY 119 (2002).

49
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Table 9.

States Adopting the Direct Primary through 1915
As of 1915: Direct Primary
Yes
No
Total

Avg. Date
of Adoption

How Passed: Initiative Used?
Yes
No
Total

Initiative States
Frequent Users

3

-

3

1907

1

Moderate Users

2

-

2

1909

2

Infrequent Users

2
-

3

33%

2

100%

3

-

3

1910

1

2

3

33%

Total Initiative States

8

-

8

1909

4

4

8

50%

Non-Initiative States
Total

37
45

40
48

1907

3
3

1907

Of the states that provided the initiative mechanism to voters, four passed direct
primary laws through that process. Maine was the first state east of the Mississippi River
to enact a process for statewide initiative, and its very first initiative to qualify for the
ballot was a requirement that the state and counties select candidates through popular
vote at primary elections, rather than by party conventions.50 It passed overwhelmingly
in 1911, the only ballot measure to pass for the next twenty-five years.

The people of Montana were immediately successful in adopting the direct
primary; in 1912, the first time the voters used the initiative, the measure qualified and
voters approved it.51 Likewise, reformers in Oregon (1910) and South Dakota, which
implemented the oft-copied “Richards primary election law” (1912), instituted the
primary through the initiative process. In the case of South Dakota, sixty years passed
before another statewide initiative was to pass.

50

See DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS (1989), summarized by the University of Southern
California's Initiative and Referendum Institute, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org.
51
See DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS (1989), summarized by the University of Southern
California's Initiative and Referendum Institute, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org.

37

While these states were able to use the initiative process directly to effect reform,
there is evidence that the presence of the initiative had indirect influences as well. In
Illinois, for example, a non-binding initiative mechanism prompted the legislature to pass
a direct primary law. The Illinois state legislature chose to limit its people to a “Public
Opinion” procedure in 1901, which was basically an advisory or non-binding initiative
power. The people used this qualified power to approve a variety of measures to limit
incumbent and party machine control, including replacement of nominating conventions
with direct primaries, restrictions on “corrupt political practices,” and simplification of
the complicated election ballots. The legislature ignored all of these requests except the
direct primary, which it passed in 1904.52 Thus, in at least one case, the initiative process
was used to signal to the legislature an issue of public importance, on which they were
then compelled to act.53
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See id.
We had hoped to include a small section analyzing direct election of U.S. Senators prior to the enactment
of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, but will relegate discussion of the issue merely to this footnote.
Prior to enactment of that amendment several states began transferring the power to appoint U.S. Senators
from state legislatures to the people. Insofar as this transfer of power represents an unwelcomed limitation
on the legislature’s power, it fits within the class of election reforms we analyze and we might assume that
such an unwelcomed transfer (if that is what it was) would be more prevalent in states where voters could
go around the legislature through the initiative process. States varied considerably, however, in the means
they employed to give voters some power to direct the legislature over its appointment of Senators.
See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth
Amendment and its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 165, 166 (1997);
U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, Cl.1 (amended 1913) (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one
Vote.”). By December of 1910, before state legislatures had convened to elect their Senators, the Boston
Herald announced, “Fourteen out of the thirty Senators who take the oath of office at the beginning of the
next Congress, have already been designated by popular vote.” GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 104 (1938) (quoting the Boston Herald, Dec. 26, 1910).
However, while the senators from many states effectively were selected through a popular vote, in most
cases it was because voters had winnowed the possible field through a direct primary the state had adopted.
Thus, in a one-party state the voters through the primary effectively determined who the legislature would
“select” as Senator, rubber stamping the voters’ decisions, putting them in “pretty much the same position
as the Electoral College.” See John S. Lapinski, Direct Election and the Emergence of the Modern Senate
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Thus, although adoption of the direct primary appears, in retrospect, to have been
almost inevitable nationwide, we should not overlook the important role that the initiative
process played in certain contexts to institute reforms that legislatures may not have been
rushing to pass. As with the other reforms we analyze, we should emphasize that the
absence of systematic differences between initiative and non-initiative states does not
prove that the initiative process was irrelevant or even unnecessary for adoption of this
particular reform. Unlike the other reforms in this paper, however, we were surprised to
learn how quickly the direct primary became a fixture of the national electoral process.
In under 15 years, the country moved from a situation where no state held party primaries
to one where almost all did.

B. Women’s Suffrage

15 (Nov. 11, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/programs/american/lapinskipaper.pdf. According to Lapinski’s count, by
1912 35 states had some form of popular control of the appointment of Senators and thirteen did not. Id. at
App. Table 1. The most populist was Oregon, in which the voters through a general election chose the
Democratic candidate and the Republican legislature obeyed their wishes and appointed him.
We are unsure about the direct or indirect effect of the initiative process on popular election of
Senators. Our uncertainty derives from sketchy data as to the effectiveness of each of these forms of
popular constraint on legislatures as well as the relative timing of passage of the initiative, the direct
primary and then the election of Senators. Of the 10 initiative states that existed at the time of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 8 (80%) had some form of popular control of the process of selection of
Senators. Of the 38 non-initiative states, 27 (71%) utilized some form of popular control. However, only
three states (to our knowledge) used the initiative process directly to bring about the popular election of
U.S. Senators, Oregon in 1908 and Montana and Oklahoma in 1912 and each of those states had already
adopted direct primaries. See University of California, Initiative and Referendum Institute, Statewide
Initiatives Since 1904 – 2000 (work in progress); see also DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE
BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989), which is summarized in pertinent part by the University of
Southern California’s Initiative and Referendum Institute, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/. Thus, both sets
of states appear to have made the transition to popular election at approximately the same rate and at the
same time. Legislatures seemed as willing to give up their power to appoint Senators as the people who
were willing to take it.
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The women’s suffrage movement that culminated in the adoption of the
Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 was dotted with repeated attempts to introduce
equivalent measures at the state level, both to state legislatures as statutory proposals and
to voters through the initiative process in states that permitted it. In fact, some date the
earliest days of the reform movement to well before the Civil War.54 The many welldocumented studies of equal suffrage have attributed the movement’s success to many
factors: the growing importance of women in the workforce, the recognition that equal
voting rights at home suited the message of democratization abroad voiced during World
War I, and the wave of populism and progressivism that drove the adoption of much
social reform from the post-Civil War period into the early twentieth century. Amid
these policy changes, of course, was the widespread adoption of the direct initiative. The
prolific introduction of direct democratic mechanisms into many states’ policymaking
processes in the 1910s and the concurrent success of state-level women’s suffrage
measures during the same decade suggest that possible relationships between the two
developments are worth exploring.
Insofar as equal suffrage directly threatened legislators’ reelection prospects, it
did so by introducing some uncertainty into the electoral base of individual legislators.
The political preferences of prospective women voters were uncertain, and one might
expect incumbents to resist a redefinition of the electorate from one that elected them to
one that included new voters with unknown allegiances and preferences. Particularly
since the adoption of equal suffrage may have spurred resistance among all-male
54
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legislatures, thereby making statutory changes difficult, pre-1920 state level women’s
suffrage is a reform that we might see as having been more successful in states in which
the initiative process was available. For the purposes of this section, we conduct a
descriptive analysis similar to those in the previous sections: were equal suffrage
measures more common in states with the initiative process? If so, were they pursued
through the initiative process or through legislative action?
Table 10.

States Adopting Equal Suffrage for Presidential or All Elections by 1920
State-Level Equal Suffrage
Yes
No
Total

How Passed: Initiative Used?
Yes
No
Total

Initiative States
Frequent Users

5

Moderate Users

3

Infrequent Users

Total Initiative States

3

5

2

3

5

40%

6

0

3

3

0%
0%

3

1

4

0

3

3

11

4

15

2

9

11

Concurrent Adopters*

5

Non-Initiative States
Total

10
26

5
18
22

28
48

* Refers to states that adopted women's suffrage before gaining the initiative, but that did adopt the initiative process by 1920:
Includes CA, CO, ID, UT, and WA.

Existing research suggests that the presence of the initiative process was not
critical to the success of state-level equal suffrage measures. Lee Ann Banaszak’s
exhaustive study of the movement explains that the wave of direct democracy was far
from complete when voters and legislators were considering state-level suffrage laws. In
fact, prior to 1920, the initiative process existed in only fifteen states (four of which
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18%

adopted equal suffrage before adopting direct legislation).55 Of the 26 states that did
extend the franchise to women prior to 1920, eleven, or 42%, had the initiative process
available to them at the time. However, while the women’s suffrage movement appears
at least as successful in states that had not adopted the initiative as in those that did, it is
important to note that many states that did extend the franchise to women did also
ultimately adopt the initiative process as well, but later; western states such as Wyoming,
Colorado, Utah, and Idaho all provided equal suffrage before the turn of the twentieth
century and then subsequently adopted the initiative process as part of the first wave of
the direct democracy movement from 1908-1913. The perception that state legislatures
in these states voluntarily adopted women’s suffrage independent of the initiative
process, then, is somewhat misleading.
Of the states that did have the initiative process available when they were
considering equal suffrage measures, how many actually used it? Of the ten states with
the initiative process that did pass a women’s suffrage measure, only two of them
(Oregon and Arizona56, both in 1912) did so through the initiative process. Legislatures
in other states, such as New York, Maine, and Rhode Island in the northeast, and in
Illinois, a state characterized at the turn of the century by strong machine politics, all
adopted statutory provisions for equal suffrage during the same period without the
55
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Arizona was granted statehood in February of 1912 with a provision for the initiative process in its
inaugural constitution. According to contemporary accounts, suffrage activists were unable to persuade the
first state legislature to consider adopting a statutory equal suffrage measure, and immediately pursued an
initiative campaign which resulted in a constitutional amendment in the state’s first election that fall.
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presence or pressure of the initiative process. Moreover, at least one state similar to the
northeastern states just mentioned, Massachusetts, and other Midwestern states such as
Arkansas and Nebraska, were all armed with the initiative process but failed to embrace
equal suffrage. In all, the availability of the initiative process to proponents of women’s
suffrage did not seem to enable reform with any more success than those that did not.
In fact, in many states, the legislature appeared to be more progressive than the
voters. Eight of the states that enacted women’s suffrage laws through the legislature57
did so after constitutional amendments were defeated at the polls. For example, suffrage
advocates in Oregon, one of the first adopters of direct legislation (1902), fought perhaps
the most trying campaigns for the vote. While the adoption of equal suffrage in 1912
made that state one of the more progressive, it was only after five previous defeats in
1884, 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1910 that the victory was won.58 Oregon’s experience
demonstrates that the initiative process, either as a direct mechanism for change or as an
indirect indication of progressivism, was not a strong benchmark for the success of
women’s suffrage.
Similarly, in Nebraska, one of the last states west of the Mississippi River to grant
women the right to vote, the legislature on more than one occasion had considered an
equal suffrage amendment that it approved but then was defeated by the voters.59 An

57

These states are North Dakota (1917), Nebraska (1917), Rhode Island (1917), Maine (1919), Missouri
(1919), Iowa (1919), Ohio (1919), and Wisconsin (1919). Chronology of Women’s Suffrage Movement
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initiative campaign in 1914 met a similar fate; the proposition granting equal suffrage to
women qualified for the ballot but was defeated among the voters by about 10,000
votes.60 Contemporary accounts attribute the failure to the strong German-Catholic
population in the state that was guided by the Church to oppose the measure, and the
strong opposition across the state to the prohibition movement, a movement that was
linked closely to the suffrage proponents.61 Notwithstanding the defeat of the 1914
proposition, encouragement by the suffragists prompted the legislature to approve partial
women’s suffrage, permitting women to vote for municipal election and for presidential
electors, in a new bill in 1917. A referendum campaign by the anti-suffrage forces
quickly formed to attempt to overturn the law, only to be thrown out in the courts in early
1919 due to the fraudulent collection of signatures.62 By then, the legislature was
considering the federal amendment, which it ratified unanimously.
As a final example, in Massachusetts, which ratified the Nineteenth Amendment
with unanimous support in both houses and which had the initiative by 1918, the defeat
of the final push for women’s suffrage came from the voters. After failing to pass
suffrage laws in 1910 and 1911, the legislature approved a constitutional amendment in
1915 that was then defeated by the voters at the polls.63 Ultimately, it was an unwilling
electorate, and not an unresponsive legislature, that was able to stymie reform.

the history of women’s suffrage in Nebraska, see:
http://www.nebraskastudies.org/0700/stories/0701_0110.html.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Bay State Defeats Suffrage by 124,000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1915, at ___.
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C. State Legislative Redistricting Prior to Baker v. Carr
As described in our discussion of redistricting commissions above, with the power
to draw district lines comes an effective tool for entrenching one’s preferred candidates
and punishing their opponents. The judiciary established a constitutional check on the
exercise of the political branches’ redistricting power only with Baker v. Carr and the
redistricting cases of the 1960s. Prior to those decisions, which effectively required
redistricting following each decennial census, states varied considerably in their
propensity to redistrict, with some doing so regularly and others ignoring for generations
state constitutional requirements that required the legislature to redistrict. States also
varied with respect to the degree of malapportionment they tolerated or encouraged in
their legislative institutions. Insofar as the availability of the initiative process may have
restrained otherwise unfettered redistricting power, we might expect initiative states to
have behaved differently with respect to pre-Baker redistricting. In non-initiative states
the voters arguably had no means of forcing legislatures to update their districts as the
population shifted. Conversely, perhaps in initiative states the “people” took advantage
of the opportunity to circumvent their legislators so as to force them to redistrict more
frequently or to tolerate a lesser degree of malapportionment.
Indeed, as the tables below suggest, we find that initiative states were somewhat
less malapportioned and that they redistricted more recently before Baker. The “average
vote to control” measure below indicates the percent of the population in a given region
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whose votes are needed in order to control a majority of the districts in 1962.64 The
lower the percent, the more grossly malapportioned the districts. On average, in initiative
states, districts comprising 32.3 percent of the population could elect a majority in the
lower house of the state legislature, while districts comprising 30.7 percent of the
population could elect a majority in the upper house of the state legislature. In contrast,
the average vote to control for initiative states was 35.5 percent for the lower house (a 3.2
point difference) and 31.0 percent for the upper house (a 0.3 point difference). (Similar
differences exist for the median states, except that the greater difference occurs among
the upper houses.)
Although the average degree of malapportionment in the two classes of states
differed slightly, the average date of their most recent redistricting preceding Baker
differed considerably. Three quarters of initiative states reapportioned their legislatures
in the 1950s, while only half of non-initiative states reapportioned their lower houses and
41 percent reapportioned their upper houses during that period. The average initiative
state redistricted in late 1948 and the median state redistricted in 1951. In contrast, often
despite state constitutions and statutes requiring periodic reapportionment, non-initiative
states, on average, had redistricted their lower houses in 1934 and their upper houses in
late 1933: a 14 and 15 year difference. However, the median state redistricted its lower
house in 1950 and its upper house in 1943: a one and eight year difference respectively.
The data illustrate that several outliers among non-initiative states “drag” down their
average year of pre-Baker redistricting. For example, Vermont was the worst among
64
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non-initiative states: it had not reapportioned its legislature since 1793 when it ratified its
Constitution.65

Average Vote to Control, 1962
Lower House
Upper House

Table 11.

Pre-1962 Last Apportionment
Lower House
Upper House

Initiative States
Frequent Users
Moderate Users
Infrequent Users
Total Initiative States

35.2%
34.7%
36.8%
35.5%

30.1%
34.2%
28.7%
31.0%

1950.1
1947.7
1947.9
1948.9

1950.1
1947.8
1947.2
1948.8

Non-Initiative States
Difference

32.3%
3.2%

30.7%
0.3%

1934.0
14.9

1933.7
15.1

Measures of Malapportionment in State Legislatures prior to Baker v. Carr

Table 12.

Average Vote to Control Measure
Lower House
Upper House
Init. States Non-Init.
Init. States Non-Init.
Median
Standard Deviation
% Reapportioning in 1950s

35.3%
8.5%

34.5%
10.7%

33.9%
12.4%

30.3%
10.2%

Year of Last Apportionment
Lower House
Upper House
Init. States Non-Init.
Init. States Non-Init.
1951
9.9
76%

1950
34.1
52%

1951
9.8
76%

Despite the fact that initiative states seemed to be slightly better apportioned in
1962 than non-initiative states and had reapportioned more recently, there is only scant
evidence that the initiative process played a direct role in the reapportionment process.
Until 1962, there were only six attempts to introduce reapportionment requirements
through the initiative process; three succeeded.66 In addition, there were ten attempts to
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These states were Arizona (1918), California (1926), and Michigan (1952). Initiative and Referendum
Institute, Statewide Initiatives Since 1904-2000, at
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1943
32.3
41%

use the initiative process actually to conduct a state legislative redistricting exercise; three
of the four that succeeded were statutory initiative measures, one of which the legislature
overturned in the following session.67 Ironically, the people of Colorado specifically
approved through a referendum a malapportioned redistricting plan, which the Supreme
Court nevertheless struck down in a companion case to Reynolds v. Sims.68
Thus, although it is possible that the presence or threat of an initiative motivated
some states to redistrict, other factors may provide a fuller explanation of the differences
we observe in the data. Those factors might include the year of entry of a state into the
Union or, as in the reforms discussed above, a correlation between presence of the
initiative and a political culture supportive of good government reforms. Given that
initiative states, in general, were relative latecomers to the Union, their first redistricting
naturally took place later than other states and they were less likely to develop a tradition
of acquiescence to static district lines, and perhaps did not have as large population shifts
between censuses. Also, maybe the political competitiveness of a state or the existence
of divided government might determine the extent of a state’s malapportionment or its
propensity to redistrict. If one party dominates either a state’s government or voting
population, perhaps we should not expect much redistricting reform initiated either from

http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Historical/State
wide%20Initiatives%201904-2000.pdf.
67
For example, the 1956 statutory initiative in Washington represented the culmination of a decade-long
battle between the League of Women Voters and the legislature in that state, and, as a statutory measure,
did not pass through the legislature first. Once it passed, the legislature modified the law in the next
session by creating new district boundaries in order to dilute the effect of the original initiative. In this
state, then, the absence of a direct legislation mechanism allowing for constitutional revision allowed the
legislature to retain control over reapportionment despite statutory efforts to the contrary.
68
377 U.S. 533 (1964). See Lucas v. Forty Fourth General Assembly, Error! Main Document
Only.377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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secure politicians in non-initiative states or from voters in initiative states who do not
view their representative institutions as particularly warped. With all that said, we do
notice some differences between these two categories of states so we should not rule out
the possibility that the availability of the initiative had some effect.

IV. Conclusions
We have been careful in this article not to overstate the significance of our
findings. We do not think we have found systematic trends to suggest that election
reform, in general, is more likely in initiative states. However, certain types of laws, such
as term limits, seem unimaginable without the initiative as an open avenue for changing
election laws, and we have dug up many other examples of particular reforms for which
the initiative played an essential role. In some cases, the effect of the initiative is direct –
meaning that voters pass election reform measures at the polls – but often it is indirect,
with legislators acting under threat of an initiative. However, in most cases, even in
initiative states, it is legislatures, not voters, who pass the various election reforms we
analyze. We tried to disentangle whether such reforms arose from initiative threats or
from other sources, cultural or otherwise. All we can conclude at this stage is that the
initiative can sometimes be an absolute prerequisite for the passage of electoral reforms
opposed by recalcitrant incumbents. However, legislatures will often pass such reforms
on their own, even though in some cases such reforms may not be as reformist as they
would be had the voters proposed them.
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In the end, we paint a mixed picture with respect to the effect of direct democracy
on election reform. However, this mixed picture we think questions the strong claims
that are often made about legislative capture inhibiting election reform. The initiative
may provide an avenue of reform that under certain circumstances could allow reformminded voters to get around obstructionist, self-interested tactics of their legislators. In
the end, however, we think much work remains to be done to identify properly the
sources for the differences that distinguish each state’s election law regimes.
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